dc.contributor.author | Sobhan, Abdus | |
dc.contributor.author | Bose, Sudipta | |
dc.contributor.author | Miah, Muhammad Shahin | |
dc.contributor.author | Razzaque, Rushdi Md Rezaur | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2023-11-30T09:06:44Z | |
dc.date.available | 2023-11-30T09:06:44Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2023 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12563 | |
dc.description | https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12563 | en_US |
dc.description.abstract | Research Questions/Issues: Using insights from agency and signaling theories, we
examine the effect on companies' market-based performance of a unique monitoring
mechanism of compliance with a corporate governance (CG) code, that is, independent certification of compliance with a CG code and type of certification provider.
Furthermore, we examine the impact of two boundary conditions, family company
status and company-level information asymmetry, influencing the effect of independent CG compliance certification and type of certification provider on the market based performance of companies.
Research Findings/Insights: Based on 1110 Bangladeshi company-year observations
from 2006 to 2017, we firstly find that independent CG compliance certification is
positively associated with companies' market-based performance. Secondly, we show
that CG compliance certification by a chartered secretarial firm is related to higher
market-based performance. Thirdly, we document that family companies attenuate
both these associations. Finally, we find that, while company-level information asymmetry reinforces the association between CG compliance certification and market based performance, it weakens the relationship between certification by a chartered
secretarial firm and companies' market-based performance.
Theoretical/Academic Implications: Our findings are consistent with the agency and
signaling theory that independent certification of CG compliance and this certification by a chartered secretarial firm reduce information asymmetry between managers
and external investors by signaling enhanced credibility of reported CG compliance
information. However, the roles of CG compliance certification and certification by a
chartered secretarial firm to reduce agency conflict and provide credible signals are
conditional on two boundary conditions: family company status and company-level
information asymmetry.
Practitioner/Policy Implications: This study's findings highlight the economic implications of a unique mechanism for monitoring compliance with an adopted CG code.
The findings have significant implications for policy makers and regulators in emerging economies. | en_US |
dc.language.iso | en_US | en_US |
dc.publisher | Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley | en_US |
dc.subject | corporate governance | en_US |
dc.subject | certification of compliance | en_US |
dc.subject | chartered secretarial firm | en_US |
dc.subject | market-based performance of companies | en_US |
dc.subject | emerging economy | en_US |
dc.title | Does certification of corporate governance compliance pay off? Evidence from a unique regulatory setting | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |