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dc.contributor.authorSobhan, Abdus
dc.contributor.authorBose, Sudipta
dc.contributor.authorMiah, Muhammad Shahin
dc.contributor.authorRazzaque, Rushdi Md Rezaur
dc.date.accessioned2023-11-30T09:06:44Z
dc.date.available2023-11-30T09:06:44Z
dc.date.issued2023
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12563
dc.descriptionhttps://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12563en_US
dc.description.abstractResearch Questions/Issues: Using insights from agency and signaling theories, we examine the effect on companies' market-based performance of a unique monitoring mechanism of compliance with a corporate governance (CG) code, that is, independent certification of compliance with a CG code and type of certification provider. Furthermore, we examine the impact of two boundary conditions, family company status and company-level information asymmetry, influencing the effect of independent CG compliance certification and type of certification provider on the market based performance of companies. Research Findings/Insights: Based on 1110 Bangladeshi company-year observations from 2006 to 2017, we firstly find that independent CG compliance certification is positively associated with companies' market-based performance. Secondly, we show that CG compliance certification by a chartered secretarial firm is related to higher market-based performance. Thirdly, we document that family companies attenuate both these associations. Finally, we find that, while company-level information asymmetry reinforces the association between CG compliance certification and market based performance, it weakens the relationship between certification by a chartered secretarial firm and companies' market-based performance. Theoretical/Academic Implications: Our findings are consistent with the agency and signaling theory that independent certification of CG compliance and this certification by a chartered secretarial firm reduce information asymmetry between managers and external investors by signaling enhanced credibility of reported CG compliance information. However, the roles of CG compliance certification and certification by a chartered secretarial firm to reduce agency conflict and provide credible signals are conditional on two boundary conditions: family company status and company-level information asymmetry. Practitioner/Policy Implications: This study's findings highlight the economic implications of a unique mechanism for monitoring compliance with an adopted CG code. The findings have significant implications for policy makers and regulators in emerging economies.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherCorporate Governance: An International Review, Wileyen_US
dc.subjectcorporate governanceen_US
dc.subjectcertification of complianceen_US
dc.subjectchartered secretarial firmen_US
dc.subjectmarket-based performance of companiesen_US
dc.subjectemerging economyen_US
dc.titleDoes certification of corporate governance compliance pay off? Evidence from a unique regulatory settingen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US


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