dc.contributor.author | Shil, Shubhankar | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-12-04T10:14:51Z | |
dc.date.available | 2017-12-04T10:14:51Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2015-07-01 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 2521-2990 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://ar.iub.edu.bd/handle/11348/313 | |
dc.description.abstract | A key dilemma for credit rating agencies (CRAs) is how they act during the time
of rating (whether neutrally or not) as their principal sources of revenue come from
whose products they are rating (client/issuers). The severe competitions among the
CRAs infuse them to grab the clienteles and retain them even by giving favorable
rating. This very issue elicits the possibility of existence of conflict of interest among
the CRAs and the issuers. This further ignites the unhealthy competition among
CRAs , particularly in a very small country like Bangladesh where the number of
CRA is not paucity in numbers ( specifically eight CRAs in Bangladesh whereas in
USA, the biggest corporate space of the world has only three major CRAs and only
the two- Moody’s and S&P are dominant). The ratings provided by CRAs are now
challenged very frequently and they are vehemently commented. The very common
observation about the rating is that CRAs are more relaxed during the boom years
and vice versa. And the paradox of competition among CRAs reduces the efficiency
and quality of ratings since it facilitates ratings shopping for the clients/issuers and
results in excessively high reported ratings. | en_US |
dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
dc.publisher | School of Business, Independent University,Bangladesh | en_US |
dc.subject | Credit Rating, Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs), Rating Shopping, Barriers to entry for CRAs. | en_US |
dc.title | An Exploratory Study on Bangladesh’s Emerging Credit Rating Industry | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |